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There is no turning back; technology is now a ubiquitous reality in the
everyday practice of law. The American Bar Association (ABA) recognized
this reality when it amended the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct
to include a Duty of Technology Competence as a comment to the Duty of
Competence. The Duty of Technology Competence requires lawyers to keep
abreast of "changes in the law and its practice, including the benefits and
risks associated with relevant technology." The language of this duty was
left purposefully broad to account for technologies today, as well as
technologies that have not yet been conceived.
Now that a majority of states have adopted the Duty of Technology
Competence as part of their rules of professional conduct, we are starting to
understand what this duty entails through the various guidance documents
that have been released. To date, the guidance documents have applied the
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duty mainly to electronic discovery, electronic storage of information, social
media, and the cloud.
A technology that has not yet been formally interpreted to apply to the
Duty of Technology Competence is the use of algorithms in law. Society, in
general, is moving beyond the Information Age to the Algorithmic Society,
as we all rely on algorithms to sort big data and provide information as
varied as music or shopping preferences to decisions regarding loan
applications or medical diagnoses. In law, lawyers are using algorithms to
provide relevant results to research inquiries, as well as to assist with making
sentencing decisions. But the use of algorithms in law, as society, is
generally going unchecked.
And there are problems with blindly relying on algorithms because they
lack transparency in generating results. With this lack of transparency,
lawyers must be extra vigilant in ethically relying on these results in the face
of machine learning bias or other. As the "Google Generation" (those born
in 1993 and after) enters law school and becomes practicing lawyers, the
legal academy must work to prepare these students to ethically rely on
algorithms. This is particularly important as the research habits of this
generation show an apt to rely on algorithms to generate results with little
evaluation of those results.
This Article provides an overview of the current Duty of Technology
Competence and argues that this ethical duty should extend to the use of
algorithms in law. Part II provides an overview of the Duty of Technology
Competence, including its development and adoption in a majority of states.
Part II also provides context for the current scope of this duty as it pertains
to e-Discovery, electronically stored information, social media, and the
cloud. Part III discusses the transition from the Information Age to the
Algorithmic Society as a foundation to extend the Duty of Technology
Competence to the use of algorithms in law. Part III goes on to discuss how
the Duty of Technology Competence will apply to the use of algorithms with
a short discussion of user habits and the perils of blindly relying on
algorithms. Part IV concludes with practical tips for incorporating the
competent use of algorithms into the law school curriculum to prepare
ethical, practice-ready lawyers.
II.

THE DUTY & SCOPE OF TECHNOLOGY COMPETENCE

One of the most notable changes to a lawyer's
responsibility rules was the creation of the Duty of Technology
in 2012. This duty is found in Comment 8 to Model Rule 1.1
competence. According to Comment 8, the new rule requires
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lawyer to keep abreast of changes in the law and its practice, including the
benefits and risks associated with relevant technology.'
The Duty of Technology Competence was created in response to the
rapid impact of technology on the practice of law, and legal tech expert
Robert Ambrogi has called this new duty a "sea change" for the legal
profession. 2

A.

The Evolving Duty of Competence

From the early days of the legal profession, the notion of a "competent"
lawyer has focused on the lawyer's knowledge of the law and ability to
represent a client.3 More recently, however, technology has rendered this
interpretation of competence outdated.4
In response to technology's impact on law,
[i]n 2009, the ABA president appointed the Ethics 20/20
Commission to conduct a study to determine how the Model Rules
will need to adapt in order to properly reflect the increased use of
technology in the practice of law. One of the main purposes of this
study was to keep the Model Rules up-to-date in order to help firms
"keep pace in this age of computers, technology, and the [i]ntemet."
After the conclusion of the three-year study, the ABA accepted six
proposed amendments to the Model Rules. One of the accepted
amendments was a revision to Comment 8 of Model Rule 1.1, a rule
[that] requires lawyers to provide competent representation. The
revision addresses the influence that technology has on the legal

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt. 8 (AM. BAR Ass'N 2016).
2.
Robert Ambrogi, New ABA Ethics Rule Underscores What EDD Lawyers Should
Already Know: There's No Hidingfrom Technology, CATALYST REPOSITORY SYS. (Aug. 16,
2012), https://catalystsecure.com/blog/2012/08/new-aba-ethics-rule-underscores-what-edd-law
yers-should-already-know-theres-no-hiding-from-technology/.
3.
See, e.g., San Diego Cty. Bar Ass'n, Legal Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 2012-1
(2012); Steven M. Puiszis, A Lawyer's Duty of Technological Competence, AM. BAR Ass'N,
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/professionalresponsibility/2017%2OMe
etings/Conference/conference materials/session4information govemance/puiszislawyers_d
utytechnological competence.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2018).
4.
See, e.g., San Diego Cty. Bar Ass'n, Legal Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 2012-1
(2012); Puiszis, supra note 3, at 1.
1.
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profession and brings to light the fact that attorneys need to keep
technology in mind in order to provide competent representation.5
Subsequently, the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct were
amended in 2012 to state that a lawyer's duty of competence now also
requires keeping "abreast of changes in the law and its practice, including
the benefits and risks associated with relevant technology." 6
More specifically, the ABA's House of Delegates voted to amend
Comment 8 to Model Rule 1.1, which pertains to competence, to read as
follows 7 :

Maintaining Competence
To maintain the requisite knowledge and skill, a lawyer should
keep abreast of changes in the law and its practice, including the
benefits and risks associated with relevant technology, engage in
continuing study and education and comply with all continuing
legal education requirements to which the lawyer is subject.I
The amended language found in Comment 8 is amorphous. This vague
language was purposeful, as the Chief Reporter of the ABA Commission on
Ethics 20/20-the Commission that was responsible for the amended
language-explained, "the specific skills lawyers will need in the decades
ahead are difficult to imagine." 9 And "the ABA made clear that the amended
comment was to remind attorneys that providing competent representation
includes keeping up with technological advancements."' 0 "Although the
comment does not affirmatively impose any new obligations on lawyers," it

5.
Lauren Kellerhouse, Note, Comment 8 of Rule 1.1: The Implications of
Technological Competence on Investigation, Discovery, and Client Security, 40 J. LEGAL
PROF. 291, 292-93 (2016) (quoting Ronald D. Rotunda, Applying the Revised ABA Model
Rules in the Age of the Internet: The Problem of Metadata, 42 HOFSTRA L. REV. 175, 176
(2013)).
6.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt. 8 (AM. BAR Ass'N 2016).

7.
Robert Ambrogi, 28 States Have Adopted Ethical Duty of Technology Competence,
LAwSITES (Mar. 16, 2015), http://www.lawsitesblog.com/2015/03/ 11 -states-have-adopted-eth
ical-duty-of-technology-competence.html.
8.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt. 8 (AM. BAR Ass'N 2016) (emphasis
added); see Ambrogi, supra note 7.
9.
Puiszis, supra note 3, at 1.
10. Kellerhouse, supra note 5, at 293.
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does act as a reminder that providing competent representation includes
adapting to technological changes."
Since the amendment, there has been little guidance interpreting the
amorphous language of the duty. Given that this falls under the Duty of
Competence, however, the foundation of technology competence means, in
part, that lawyers are now "required to take reasonable steps to protect their
clients from ill-conceived uses of technology."12
From this foundation, the concept of technology competence is
"frequently thought of encompassing the protection of information in a
lawyer or law firm's possession from being inadvertently disclosed,
accessed or acquired by third parties."' 3 That is certainly part of it, but the
new Duty of Technology Competence "is far broader than simply protecting
client information or cyber security."1 4 As noted, "these seemingly simple
nine new words have significantly expanded the practical scope of what
today's ethical lawyer must understand and confront."' 5
B.

State-Adopted Rules

The amended language of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
provides guidance to the states to formulate their own rules of professional
conduct.1 6 But each state, through its rule-setting body, must first adopt the
model rule for it to apply to lawyers in that jurisdiction. In doing so, "each
state is free to adopt, reject, ignore or modify the Model Rules.""
To date, thirty-one states have adopted the Duty of Technology
Competence by amending the respective Duty of Competence. These states
are: Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Idaho,
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Minnesota,
Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, North

11. Id.
12. Anthony E. Davis, The Ethical Obligation To Be Technologically Competent, N.Y.
L.J. (Jan. 8, 2016, 3:00 AM), https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/almID/120274652720
3/the-ethical-obligation-to-be-technologically-competent/.
13. See, e.g., State Bar of Ariz., Ethics Op. 09-04 (2009) (explaining Rule 1.1's
competence requirement "appl[ies] not only to a lawyer's legal skills, but also generally to
'those matters reasonably necessary for the representation').
14. See, e.g., id; Puiszis, supra note 3.
15. Randy L. Dryer, Litigation, Technology & Ethics: Teaching Old Dogs New Tricks
or Legal Luddites Are No Longer Welcome in Utah, 28 UTAH B.J. 12, 13 (2015).
16. Ambrogi, supra note 7.
17. Id
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Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Utah,
Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.'"
Of the thirty-one states that have adopted a Duty of Technology
Competence, twenty-five have adopted the exact language found in the
Model Rule.' 9 The remaining states have adopted the Duty of Technology
Competence with minor variations that help further interpret the duty or
create a stronger ethical obligation. New York, Colorado, West Virginia, and
Florida, for example, have added additional specificity to their adopted rules.
New York adopted a variation of the duty by specifying that a lawyer
should "keep abreast of the benefits and risks associated with technology the
lawyer uses to provide services to clients or to store or transmit confidential
information." 20 This variation is more specific in that New York lawyers

18. ARIZ. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt. 6 (STATE BAR OF ARIZ. 2015); ARK.
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt. 8 (ARK. SUP. CT. 2014); COLO. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt. 8 (COLO. BAR Ass'N 2016); CONN. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.1
cmt. 6 (CONN. SUP. CT. 2013); DEL. LAW. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt. 8 (DEL.
SUP. CT. 2013); RULES REGULATING FLA. BAR r. 4-1.1 cmt. 8 (THE FLA. BAR 2016); IDAHO
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt. 8 (IDAHO STATE BAR 2014); ILL. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt. 8 (ILL. SUP. CT. 2015); IND. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt. 6
(IND. SUP. CT. 2018); IOWA RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 32:1.1 cmt. 8 (IOWA STATE BAR
Ass'N 2015); KAN. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt. 8 (KAN. SUP. CT. 2014); Ky.
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 3.130(1.1) cmt. 6 (KY. SUP. CT. 2018); MASS. RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt. 8 (MASS. SUP. JUD. CT. 2015); MINN. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt. 8 (MINN. SUP. CT. 2015); Mo. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 4-1.1 cmt.
6 (SUP. CT. Mo. 2017); NEB. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT § 3-501.1 cmt. 6 (NEB. SUP. CT.
2017); N.H. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt. 8 (N.H. SUP. CT. 2015); N.M. RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT r. 16-101 cmt. 9 (STATE BAR OF N.M. 2013); N.Y. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt. 8 (N.Y. STATE BAR Ass'N 2015); N.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r.
1.1 cmt. 8 (N.C. BAR Ass'N 2014); N.D. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt. 5 (N.D. Sup.
CT. 2015); OHIO RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt. 8 (OHIO SUP. CT. 2015); OKLA.
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt. 6 (OKLA. SUP. CT. 2016); PA. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt. 8 (PA. SUP. CT. 2013); TENN. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt. 8
(TENN. SUP. CT. 2017); UTAH RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt. 8 (UTAH SUP. CT.
2015); RULES OF INTEGRATION OF THE VA. STATE BAR r. 1.1 cmt. 6 (VA. BAR Ass'N 2016);
WASH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt. 8 (WASH. SUP. CT. 2016); W. VA. RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt. 8 (W. VA. STATE BAR 2014); Wis. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
FOR ATTORNEYS r. 20:1.1 cmt. 8 (WIS. SUP. CT. 2016); WYo. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
(WYO. SUP. CT. 2014); see Ambrogi, supra note 7.
19. The following twenty-five states have adopted the language of the ABA amendment
verbatim: Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin, and
Wyoming. See Ambrogi, supra note 7.
20. N.Y. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt. 8 (N.Y. STATE BAR Ass'N 2009).
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must be aware of "the dangers of technology particularly when dealing with
information storage or providing client services." 2
Likewise, Colorado's amendment varies from the Model Rule to read:
"To maintain the requisite knowledge and skill, a lawyer should keep abreast
of changes in the law and its practice, and changes in communications and
other relevant technologies, engage in continuing study and
education ... ." 22 Through this language, "Colorado appears to emphasize
competence in technological communications as part of an attorney's
professional responsibility." 2 3 Moreover, like other states, Colorado's
amendment "cross-references the rule on confidentiality of information, in
effect signaling to attorneys that they should be wary of the impact of new
technology on the privacy of communications and on modes of information
storage." 24

While New York and Colorado have made their rules more specific in
terms of the types of technology competence lawyers should have, other
state bars have imposed stronger ethical duties. "For example, West Virginia
changed the ABA language of 'a lawyer should keep abreast' to 'a lawyer
must keep abreast."' 25 By purposefully changing the language from "should"
to "must," West Virginia has signaled a stronger ethical duty to its lawyers.
Finally, Florida added more specificity to its rule while also creating a
stronger ethical duty. "The Florida bar added language detailing that
competent representation could involve retention of 'a non-lawyer advisor
with established technological competence in the relevant field,' as well as
safeguarding
any confidential
information
'including
electronic
transmissions and communications.' 26 The additional specificity recognizes
"the possible need of third-party assistance to fully accommodate clients'
technology needs." 27 It is coupled with a stronger ethical duty because, in

addition to amending its professional conduct rules, Florida now also

21. Katy Ho, Defining the Contours of an Ethical Duty of Technological Competence,
30 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 853, 864 (2017) (citing Robert Ambrogi, Two More States Adopt
Duty of Technology Competence, LAwSITES (Nov. 11, 2015), http://www.lawsitesblog.com/20
15/11 /two-more-states-adopt-duty-of-technology-competence.html).
22. COLO. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt. 8 (COLO. BAR ASS'N 2016); see Ho,
supra note 21, at 865.
23. Ho, supra note 21, at 865.
24. Id.
25. Id. (citing W. VA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt. 8 (W. VA. STATE BAR
2014)) (emphasis added).
26. Id. (citing In re Amendments to Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar 4-1.1 and 6-10.3, 200
So. 3d 1225, 1226 (Fla. 2016)).
27. Id
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requires mandatory technology-related CLE credits to ensure that lawyers
can comply with the new standard.28
As mentioned, most of the states that have adopted the Duty of
Technology Competence have done so by adopting the exact language of the
Model Rule. A handful of other states have adopted the duty with minor
variation. And still other states have not formally adopted the duty at all,
only referencing it in an ethics opinion, thus informally incorporating it into
the lawyer's ethical duties. This is the approach the State Bar of California
took when it relied on Comment 8 to Model Rule 1.1 in reaching its
conclusion in a 2015 State Bar ethics opinion. The ethics opinion addressed
a lawyer's ethical duties involving the discovery of electronically stored
information. 29

With the minimal guidance found in the text of the rules themselves,
lawyers are left to mostly wonder what this new duty encompasses.
C.

Guidelines, Advisory Opinions, & Cases Interpretingthe Duty

While the outer boundaries of the Duty of Technology Competence
have not yet been established, the current interpretations generally apply to
electronically stored information and data, e-Discovery, social media, and
the cloud.30 These current interpretations come through the form of
guidelines, advisory opinions, and cases interpreting the Duty of Technology
Competence. 3' Below is a select sampling of these interpretations that offers
the most guidance to date.
A few of the interpreting documents were released before the ABA
Model Rules were amended. These documents act as precursors to the duty
and provide some guidance on what the duty encompasses. For example,
Washington Bar Association Opinion 2215 from 2012 states, "[a] lawyer
using [a third-party] service must . .. conduct a due diligence investigation
of the provider and its services and cannot rely on lack of technological

28. Id.
29. See State Bar of Cal. Standing Comm. on Prof 1 Responsibility & Conduct, Formal
Op. 2015-193 (2015).
30. See generally Kellerhouse, supra note 5.
3 1. See generally Stacey Blaustein et al., Digital Directionfor the Analog AttorneyDataProtection, E-Discovery, and the Ethics of Technological Competence in Today's World
of Tomorrow, 22 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 10 (2016) (discussing various ethical rules and guidance
pertaining to the Duty of Technology Competence); John O'Neill, Protecting Living Fossils:
Crafting Technology Ethics Standardsfor the District of Columbia, 30 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
933 (2017) (discussing various rules and cases interpreting the Duty of Technology
Competence).
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sophistication to excuse the failure to do so."32 The opinion goes on to list
seven best practices that a lawyer without advanced technological
knowledge should perform.33 Finally, the opinion states,
[b]ecause the technology changes rapidly, and the security threats
evolve equally rapidly, a lawyer using online data storage must not
only perform initial due diligence when selecting a provider and
entering into an agreement, but must also monitor and regularly
review the security measures of the provider. Over time, a particular
provider's security may become obsolete or become substandard to
systems developed by other providers. [Ultimately, a] lawyer may
use online data storage systems to store and back up client
confidential information as long as the lawyer takes reasonable
care.34

The Washington Bar Association opinion shows that a lawyer's ethical
duty regarding technology does not stop after initial due diligence. It is an
ongoing duty that requires long-term reasonable care.
In addition to the Washington advisory opinion discussing electronically
stored information, in 2015, New York released a set of social media
guidelines that rely on its amended duty of technology competence. 35 The
guidelines note, in pertinent part, that "[a] lawyer has a duty to understand
the benefits and risks and ethical implications associated with social media,
including its use as a mode of communication, an advertising tool and a
means to research and investigate matters."

36

The guidelines go on to state:
[a]s indicated by [ABA Rule of Professional Conduct] Rule 1.1,
Comment 8, it is important for a lawyer to be current with
technology. While many people simply click their agreement to the
terms and conditions for use of an [electronic social media]
network, a lawyer who uses an [electronic social media] network in
his practice should review the terms and conditions, including

32. Wash. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof' IEthics, Advisory Op. 2215 (2012).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. See THE Soc. MEDIA COMM. OF THE COMMERCIAL AND FED. LITIG. SECTION, N.Y.
STATE BAR Ass'N, SOCIAL MEDIA ETHICS GUIDELNES (2015) [hereinafter GUIDELINES],
http://www.nysba.org/workarea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=47547.
36. Id at 3.
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Not only is social media use implicated here, the guidelines also
mention conducting research. "If an attorney cannot ascertain the
functionality of a website, the attorney must proceed with great caution in
conducting research on that particular site." 38
Lastly, the guidelines state, "[w]hile a lawyer may not delegate his
obligation to be competent, he or she may rely, as appropriate, on
professionals in the field of electronic discovery and social media to assist in
obtaining such competence." 3 9
The State Bar of California has also attempted to provide guidance on
the Duty of Technology Competence. In 2015, the State Bar of California
issued an opinion that provided
three options from which a lawyer should choose when confronted
with unfamiliar technology: (1) become familiar with the
technology, (2) consult with or delegate to someone who is familiar
with the technology, or (3) decline to represent the client. Although
California's hypothetical applies specifically to e-discovery, its
conclusions can be read as applying to all of the benefits and risks
of technology as defined in comment 8.40
Ultimately, these various guidance documents provide additional insight
to a lawyer seeking guidance on complying with the Duty of Technology
Competence.

37. Id. (quoting ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics & Prof 1 Responsibility, Formal Op.
466, at 5-6 (2014)). The guidelines further provide that "[c]ompetence may require
understanding the often lengthy and unclear 'terms of service' of a social media platform and
whether the platform's features raise ethical issues. It also may require reviewing other
materials, such as articles, comments, and blogs posted about how such social media platform
actually functions." Id. at 3 n.5; see also Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y. Comm. on Prof 1
& Jud. Ethics, Formal Op. 2012-2, at 2 (2012) [hereinafter Formal Op. 2012-2],
https://www2.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/20072303-FormalOpinion2012-02JuryResearchan
dSocialMedia.pdf.
38. GUIDELINES, supranote 35, at 3 (quoting Formal Op. 2012-2, supra note 37, at 7).
39. Id. at 4.
40. O'Neill, supra note 31, at 936-37.
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III. THE FUTURE OF THE DUTY IN THE ALGORITHMIC SOCIETY

If this new Duty of Technology Competence seems overwhelming, it is
needed more than ever because society will never be less technologically
sophisticated than it is today. As we move from the mid-Information Age to
the Algorithmic Society, technology will become even more ubiquitous in
everyday life and the practice of law, and algorithms will increasingly be
used to govern populations. 41
A.

From the Information Age to the Algorithmic Society

Historians are apt to argue about the precise onset of the Information
Age. Did it start in the late 1960s with the birth of the internet? 42 Did it start
in 1973 with Motorola's first mobile phone? 43 Or did it start with the launch
of IBM's first mass-marketed personal computer in 1982?44 The reality is

that it was a combination of all of these events. These events laid the
foundation for the Information Age, which has now extended to "the rollout
of broadband access, cheap mobile phones, cloud computing, and more
45
recently social media."

The early days of the Information Age were a fairly simple transition of
physical products becoming digital. 46 "At first, the pre-[Information] Age
evolved slowly. Products became digitized. Photos became bits. Knowledge
moved from encyclopedias to Wikipedia. The phone book became an online
directory. Printed magazines became websites." 47
Then society entered the mid-Information Age, which law is just
beginning to grasp. 48 "This is a period that straddles the age where digital is
just becoming accepted into the mainstream, and the age where digital is

41. See, e.g., E-mail from Natasha Duarte, Policy Analyst, Ctr. for Democracy & Tech.,
to James Vacca, Chairman, N.Y.C. Council Comm. (Oct. 16, 2017), https://cdt.org/files/2017/
10 /NYC-algorithm-hearing-statement- 10-16-17.pdf.
42. See Barry M. Leiner, et al., BriefHistory of the Internet, INTERNET Soc'Y (1997),
https://www.internetsociety.org/internet/history-internet/brief-history-internet/.
43. See Zachary Seward, The FirstMobile Phone Call Was Made 40 Years Ago Today,
ATLANTIC (Apr. 3, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2013/04/the-firstmobile-phone-call-was-made-40-years-ago-today/274611/.
44. See Timeline of Computer History, COMPUTER HISTORY, http://www.computer
history.org/timeline/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2018).
45. Paul Hudson, The Dawning of the Digital Age, INTERSPERIENCE.COM, http://www.
intersperience.com/article_more.asp?art id=46 (last visited Feb. 24, 2018).
46. See Tom Goodwin, The Three Ages of Digital, TECHCRUNCH (June 23, 2016),
https://techcrunch.com/2016/06/23/the-three-ages-of-digital/.

47. Id.
48. See id.
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fully immersed into our society." 49 This age "represents an age where the
BBC won't play certain content in the U.K. because global digital rights
have not been cleared. It's where headlines featuring Trump or Apple rule
50
the world, because eyeballs pay the bills."
As we move beyond the mid-Information Age, however, this is the shift
"that really changes everything." 5 ' The concept of digital will move into the
background and will be understood as transformative yet irrelevant. 52 "In the
post-[Information] Age, digital technology will be a vast, quiet element
forming the seamless backbone of life. The intemet will be a background
utility [like electricity], noticeable only in its absence." 53 It will come to us
through "huge multinational [providers] that track [our] every move ....
[The providers] will be the holders of data and the arbiters of mass
behavioral change." 54
Society will move beyond the abundance of information that defined the
Information Age to increasingly rely on algorithms that sort big data in the
"Algorithmic Society."
The ubiquitous use of algorithms in society has been explored in books
such as Weapons of Math Destruction: How Big Data Increases Inequality
and Threatens Democracy by Cathy O'Neil; Algorithms to Live by: The
Computer Science of Human Decisions by Brian Christian and Tom
Griffiths; Automate This: How Algorithms Took Over Our Markets, Our
Jobs, and the World by Christopher Steiner; Sensemaking: The Power of the
Humanities in the Age of the Algorithm by Christian Madsbjerg; and The
Master Algorithm: How the Quest for the Ultimate Learning Machine Will
55
Remake Our World by Pedro Domingos.
Each of these books offers a glimpse into the benefits and risks
associated with the use of algorithms. They discuss how algorithms are
being used for greater efficiency, sometimes at a significant cost. For

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
See BRIAN CHRISTIAN & TOM GRIFFITHS, ALGORITHMS TO LIVE BY: THE
COMPUTER SCIENCE OF HUMAN DECISIONS (2016); PEDRO DOMINGOS, THE MASTER
ALGORITHM: HOW THE QUEST FOR THE ULTIMATE LEARNING MACHINE WILL REMAKE OUR
WORLD (2015); CHRISTIAN MADSBJERG, SENSEMAKING: THE POWER OF THE HUMANITIES IN
THE AGE OF THE ALGORITHM (2017); CATHY O'NEIL, WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION:
How BIG DATA INCREASES INEQUALITY AND THREATENS DEMOCRACY (2016);
CHRISTOPHER STEINER, AUTOMATE THIS: How ALGORITHMS TOOK OVER OUR MARKETS,
OUR JOBS, AND THE WORLD (2012).
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example, in Weapons of Math Destruction, a New York Times Notable
Book of 2016, author and mathematician Cathy O'Neil notes that
"[i]ncreasingly, the decisions that affect our lives where we go to school,
whether we can get a job or a loan, how much we pay for health insurance
are being made . . ." by machines.

56

She goes on to state "the mathematical

models being used today are unregulated and uncontestable even when they
are wrong." 57
Much like the intemet as a background utility in the mid-Information
Age, so too are algorithms often seen as transformative yet irrelevant in the
Algorithmic Society. Algorithms are now working in the background to
parse vast amounts of data and recommend important actions. Yet they are
often working with little oversight because of their proprietary nature.
Because of the high stakes involved, some have called for an "algorithmic
social contract," whereby a conceptual framework for the regulation of
artificial intelligence (AI) and algorithmic systems is created by a pact
between various human stakeholders and mediated by machines. 58
But Al advances have also raised many questions about the
regulatory and governance mechanisms for autonomous machines
and complex algorithmic systems. Some commentators are
concerned that algorithmic systems are not accountable because
they are black boxes whose inner workings are not transparent to all
stakeholders. Others raised concern over people unwittingly living
in filter bubbles created by news recommendation algorithms.
Others argue that data-driven decision-support systems can
perpetuate injustice, because they can also be biased either in their
design, or by picking up human biases in their training data.
Furthermore, algorithms can create feedback loops that reinforce
inequality, for example in the use of Al in predictive policing or
creditworthiness prediction, making it difficult for individuals to
escape the vicious cycle of poverty. 59

56. WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION, https://weaponsofmathdestructionbook.com/
(last visited Mar. 6, 2018); see also O'NEIL, supra note 55.
57. WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION, https://weaponsofmathdestructionbook.com/
(last visited Mar. 6, 2018); see also O'NEIL, supra note 55.
58. lyad Rahwan, Society-in-the-Loop: Programmingthe Algorithmic Social Contract,
20 ETHICS INFO. TECH. 5, 6 (2018).
59. Id. at 5-6 (citations omitted).
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As lawyers increasingly rely on algorithms in the everyday practice of
law, 60 the legal profession must take active steps to ensure competent use of
algorithms to temper the risks associated with their use. "[I]n chasing the
amazing possibilities, the profession must not forget the fundamentals. In
our race to use technology to be better, faster and cheaper, we must not
forget that the law's effect will always [be] endured by humans . . .. [W]e

cannot ignore the danger of a failure of competence." 61
So, as we move from the mid-Information Age to the Algorithmic
Society, lawyers must prepare for the eventualities that befall the use of
artificial intelligence and algorithms in the practice of law. 62
B.

The Duty of Technology Competence Applied to Algorithms

The Duty of Technology Competence requires lawyers to keep abreast
of "changes in the law and its practice, including the benefits and risks
associated with relevant technology." 63 While the duty has not yet been
formally interpreted as applying to the use of algorithms in law, a lawyer
should understand the benefits and risks associated with the use of
algorithms to ensure competent representation.
Lawyers, after all, are in the information business. Information is the
foundation of representation, as lawyers rely, in part, on case precedent to
determine the law and advocate for a client. 64 This information retrieval is
generally now reliant upon algorithms to provide "relevant" results. The list
of relevant results provided with relative ease is an absolute benefit of using
algorithms in law. It allows for great efficiency, which equates to greater
access to justice. 65 However, the problem is how competent it all looks,
enticing lawyers to blindly rely on the results.
And it is bound to become an even bigger issue as the Google
Generation enters law practice. This generation is generally thought of as

60. See Brian Sheppard, Incomplete Innovation and the PrematureDisruption ofLegal
Services, 2015 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1797, 1853, 1857 (2015).
61. Wendy Wen Yun Chang, Time to Regulate Al in the Legal Profession?
(Perspective), BIG LAW Bus. (July 12, 2016), https://biglawbusiness.com/time-to-regulate-aiin-the-legal-profession-perspective/.
62. See Goodwin, supra note 46.
63. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt. 8 (AM. BAR Ass'N 2016).
64. See Morris L. Cohen, Research Habits of Lawyers, 9 JURIMETRICS J. 183, 187
(1969).
65. Lindsey Frischer, How to Leverage Legal Technology and Bridge the Justice Gap,
ROSS INTELLIGENCE (Jan. 9, 2017), https://blog.rossintelligence.com/how-to-leverage-legaltechnology-and-bridge-the-justice-gap-3d63f096b32a.
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being born after 1993.66 And there have been some interesting findings
about their information behavior. As early as 2008, studies show that "the
speed of young people's web searching means that little time is spent in
evaluating information, either for relevance, accuracy or authority." 67
Additionally, "[f]aced with a long list of search hits, young people find it
difficult to assess the relevance of the materials presented and often print off
pages with no more than a perfunctory glance at them." 68 Also, "[y]oung
scholars are using tools that require little skill: they appear satisfied with a
very simple or basic form of searching." 69 In addition to the user habits of
the Google Generation, society in general has become increasingly
comfortable with relying on the top results that an algorithm generates.
"[R]esearch indicates that over ninety percent of searchers do not go past
page one of the search results and over fifty percent do not go past the first
three results on page one." 70 These ingrained research habits generally
equate with allowing the database algorithms to do the heavy lifting and
decide what is relevant.
While there has been little discussion of the research habits of law
students' use of algorithms to conduct research, it is likely that law students
will fall back on research techniques they know and feel comfortable with.7
As part of the Google Generation 72 and beyond, it means that these students,
unless taught otherwise, will rely heavily on the algorithms to select relevant
material after performing basic searches, and they will also spend little time
evaluating the results.
Accordingly, the major legal databases, Westlaw and LexisNexis, are
now using search algorithms to provide a better user experience. Both
vendors released a new search experience in 2010 with the rollout of new
interfaces and the search

engines behind them. 73 Historically,

these

databases have been considered highly reputable by the legal profession, and

66. Ian Rowlands et al., The Google Generation: The Information Behaviour of the
Researcher of the Future, 60 ASLIB PROCEEDINGS: N. INFORMATION PERSPECTIVES 290, 291
(2008).
67. Id. at 295.
6 8. Id.
69. Id. at 297.
70. See Alexander J.A.M. van Deursen & Jan A.G.M. van Dijk, Using the Internet: Skill
Related Problems in Users' Online Behavior, INTERACTING WITH COMPUTERS, at *6 (2009),

https://www.utwente.nl/nl/bms/cw/bestanden/Using%/`20the%/`20Internet-%/`2OSkill%/`20related
%20problems.pdf.
71. See, e.g., Ellie Margolis & Kristen Murray, Using Information Literacy to Prepare
Practice-ReadyGraduates, 39 U. HAW. L. REV. 1, 2, 23 (2016).
72. The current 3Ls were born in 1994, on average.
73. See, e.g., Catherine M. Dunne, The Next Generation of Westlaw: WestlawNext, 54
LAW LIBR. LIGHTS 1, 1 (2010), http://www.l1sdc.org/assets/LLL/54/lights 54-1 .pdf.
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nearly every law student in the country learns how to perform legal research
using them. From a recent empirical study, it has been shown that the legal
database algorithms show a surprising amount of variation in case law
results that each algorithm deems relevant for a particular search query. 74
Therefore, a user relying on the first page of results in a legal database may
get significant variation in the relevant cases on a particular topic. The user,
through hasty searching and vetting of results, has just allowed the algorithm
to have a significant role in selecting the cases the algorithm deems should
advance the law.
Couple the reliance on these legal databases with the categorical blind
reliance on algorithms in general, and it could be a recipe for disaster to
clients that rely on lawyers to counsel and advocate for them. One of the
main risks is in the predictive coding used to generate results. "Predictive
coding is a machine learning process that uses software to take keyword
searches/logic, entered by people, for the purpose of finding responsive
documents, and applies it to much larger data sets to reduce the number of
irrelevant and non-responsive documents that need to be reviewed
manually." 7 5 Part of the risk of predictive coding is that the user cannot
know how the algorithm generated results because of the lack of
transparency 76 and the machine learning bias that may be present in the
code. 7 7 Without knowing how the algorithm generated results, lawyers are
left to their own devices to evaluate results.
Given the lack of transparency and other issues with blindly relying on
algorithms,' lawyers may be at a loss as to how to competently use this
ubiquitous technology. Without formal guidance on point, lawyers should
draw parallels to the current guidance documents pertaining to the Duty of
Technology Competence. For example, as noted above, the Washington Bar
Association states that, "[a] lawyer using [a third-party] service must . .
conduct a due diligence investigation of the provider and its services and

74.

Susan Nevelow Mart, The Algorithm as a Human Artifact: Implicationsfor Legal

[Re]search, 109 L. LIBR. J. 387, 412 (2017).
75. Predictive Coding, EXTERRO, https://www.exterro.com/basics-of-e-discovery/predic
tive-coding/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2018).
76. See Lee Rainie & Janna Anderson, Theme 7: The Need Grows for Algorithmic
Literacy, Transparency and Oversight, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Feb. 8, 2017), http://www.pew
internet.org/2017/02/08/theme-7-the-need-grows-for-algorithmic-literacy-transparency-and-ov
ersight/.
77. Jason Tashea, Courts are Using AI to Sentence Criminals. That Must Stop Now,
WIRED (Apr. 17, 2017, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2017/04/courts-using-ai-sentencecriminals-must-stop-now/.
78. Paul Cleverley, Search Algorithms Neutral or Biased?, 41 ONLNE SEARCHER 12
(Oct. 2017).
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cannot rely on lack of technological sophistication to excuse the failure to do
so." 79 Additionally, we know from the Washington Bar Association opinion
that a lawyer's ethical duty regarding technology does not stop after initial
due diligence. It is an ongoing duty that requires long-term reasonable
care.so Analogously, competent lawyers must continuously monitor their use
of a vendor and the corresponding algorithms to ensure that they use
reasonable care when relying on the algorithm's results. We also know that a
lawyer's lack of technological sophistication is no excuse, so the lawyer
must at least have a basic understanding of the pitfalls associated with using
algorithms" to be able to vet the content.
When drawing parallels to New York's social media guidance,
particularly as it pertains to research, we see that "[i]f an attorney cannot
ascertain the functionality of a website, the attorney must proceed with great
caution in conducting research on that particular site." 8 2 Analogously, when
a lawyer is using an algorithm but cannot ascertain the functionality, the
lawyer must proceed with great caution when relying on the results.
Lastly, from the State Bar of California opinion, we see "three options
from which a lawyer should choose when confronted with unfamiliar
technology: (1) become familiar with the technology, (2) consult with or
delegate to someone who is familiar with the technology, or (3) decline to
represent the client."8 3 As noted above, "[a]lthough California's hypothetical
applies specifically to e-discovery, its conclusions can be read as applying to
all of the benefits and risks of technology as defined in comment 8."84
Likewise, a competent lawyer, when confronted with an unfamiliar
algorithm, will become familiar with it by looking for patterns, such as
biased results or recognizing foundational cases, for example. If the lawyer
cannot confidently ascertain the legitimacy of the results, the lawyer should
consult with or delegate to someone who can.

79. Wash. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof'I Ethics, Op. 2215 (2012).
80. See id.
81. See, e.g., Virginia Eubanks, The Policy Machine, SLATE (Apr. 30, 2015, 1:55 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2015/04/the_dangersof lettingalgorit
hmsenforcepolicy.html (providing that algorithms can cause real damage when not properly
understood, especially when related to legal context); When Not to Trust the Algorithm, HARv.
Bus. REVIEW (Oct. 6, 2016), https://hbr.org/ideacast/2016/10/when-not-to-trust-the-algorithm
.html (providing an interview with author Cathy O'Neil on her book Weapons of Math
Destruction).
82. GUIDELINES, supra note 35, at 3 (quoting Formal Op. 2012-2, supra note 37, at 7).
83. See State Bar of Cal. Standing Comm. on Prof 1 Responsibility & Conduct, Formal
Op. 2015-193 (2015).
84. O'Neill, supra note 31, at 937.
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While the parallels to the various guidance documents provide some
insight into the competent use of algorithms in law, the underlying principle
is that a lawyer, at a minimum, must be aware of the issues surrounding the
use of algorithms and use reasonable care. "A lawyer might be able to
recognize anomalies due to his or her legal training, and know enough to test
the answer, ask a different question, or adjust the data. If the lawyer is
looking, that is."8 5

Ultimately, lawyers must be aware of the issues surrounding the use of
algorithms in law to act as information fiduciaries for their clients.
Generally speaking, a fiduciary is one who has special obligations
of loyalty and trustworthiness toward another person. The fiduciary
must take care to act in the interests of the other person, who is
sometimes called the principal, the beneficiary, or the client. The
client puts their trust or confidence in the fiduciary, and the
fiduciary has a duty not to betray that trust or confidence.
Fiduciaries have two basic duties. The first is a duty of care. The
fiduciary must take care to act competently and diligently so as not
to harm the interests of the principal, beneficiary, or client. The
second, and in many ways more important duty, is the duty of
loyalty. Fiduciaries must keep their clients' interests in mind and act
in their clients' interests. 86
Therefore, competent lawyers must understand the information they rely
on and provide advice to a client that is the result of the lawyer's
independent, educated judgment. "A lawyer must know, test, look,
supervise, understand, and make all necessary adjustments so that while he
or she may be using Al as a tool, the ultimate advice is still independently
his or hers and is ethically compliant." 7 After all, one benefit of using a
lawyer's expertise is that the lawyer is trained to spot mistakes. "Lay people
accessing Al legal services directly without a lawyer have no such
advantage, and might not know that something is wrong until they have
relied on the wrong answer and taken a legal step, and it is too late.""

85. Chang, supra note 61.
86. Jack M. Balkin, Information Fiduciariesand the FirstAmendment, 49 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 1183, 1207-08 (2016).
87. Chang, supra note 61.
88. Id-
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FOR TEACHING THE COMPETENT USE OF ALGORITHMS

Many law schools make it their mission to graduate competent, practiceready lawyers who are able to ethically represent clients. As technology
becomes a larger part of the everyday practice of law, the legal academy
must take an active role in helping to shape lawyers that can comply with the
Duty of Technology Competence. Part of this compliance will mean using
reasonable care when relying on algorithms. We must undo some of the bad
research habits that the law students have gained along the way, and we
must stress that client representation should be the result of independent
judgment.
In practice, this may be part of a larger discussion on evaluating
resources and results. For example, as part of a hands-on portion of a
criminal law class,8 9 the professor or law librarian could provide a fact
pattern and ask the students to evaluate the factors considered in criminal
sentencing to recommend a sentence. The instructor could then lead the
students to a software program used in sentencing called COMPAS that
assesses the risk that the defendant would commit more crimes. 90 As the
instructor led the students to COMPAS, the instructor could discuss some of
the issues surrounding the use of algorithms in sentencing, including the
unintentional bias that is potentially coded into the algorithm that, for
example, treats race as a significant factor in assessing the risk of
committing future crimes. 9' The students could then compare their own
independent judgment as to the recommended sentence and compare it to
that of COMPAS.
Another obvious place to incorporate instruction about the ethical use of
algorithms is as a part of the foundational legal research training. Because
most legal research databases now rely on sophisticated algorithms to
generate results, it behooves professors to point out the Duty of Technology
Competence during legal research instruction, as well as provide information
on the associated pitfalls of blindly relying on the technology.

89. See generally Brooke J. Bowman, Researching Across the Curriculum: The Road
Must Continue Beyond the FirstYear, 51 OKLA. L. REV. 503, 557-58 (2009).
90. Adam Liptak, Sent to Prison by a Software Program's Secret Algorithms, N.Y.
TIMES (May 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/01/us/politics/sent-to-prison-by-a-sof
tware-programs-secret-algorithms.html.
91. See Matthias Speilkamp, Inspecting Algorithms for Bias, MIT TECH. REVIEW
(June 12, 2017), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/607955/inspecting-algorithms-forbias/ (explaining that under the racial bias in COMPAS, different races are labeled more or
less likely to re-offend, whether or not they actually do).
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As part of this ethical standard, the instructor could look to the
Principles for Legal Research Competency published by the American
Association of Law Libraries. The principles advanced by the American
Association of Law Libraries are as follows:
I.

II.
III.
IV.
V.

A successful legal researcher possesses foundational
knowledge of the legal system and legal information
sources.
A successful legal researcher gathers information through
effective and efficient research strategies.
A successful legal researcher critically evaluates
information.
A successful legal researcher applies information
effectively to resolve a specific issue or need.
A successful legal researcher distinguishes between ethical
and unethical uses of information, and understands the
legal issues associated with the discovery, use, or
application of information. 92

At a minimum, principles III and V go directly to the competent and
ethical use of algorithms in law. "Lawyers who do not meet [these]
standard[s] may well find themselves at risk of both disciplinary and
malpractice actions." 93
To that end, in The Algorithm as a Human Artifact, author Susan
Nevelow Mart provides a short, practical assignment for instructors to use as
they train law students to competently use algorithms and evaluate results. 94
Appendix A of the article provides a class assignment called "How
Algorithms Differ-Searching for Case Law." 95 The assignment provides a
fact pattern and asks students to run searches in Google Scholar, LexisNexis,
and Westlaw looking for relevant cases. After the searches, there is a series
of questions designed to help the student evaluate the results. 96
Through a mixture of practical, hands-on assignments and intermittent
discussions surrounding these topics as they arise, the legal academy can

92. AM. Ass'N OF LAW LIBRARIES, PRINCIPLES AND STANDARDS FOR LEGAL
RESEARCH COMPETENCIES (2013), https://archives.library.illinois.edu/erec/AALLArchives/
8501445a/PSLRC13.pdf
93. M. H. Hoeflich & Frank Siler, New Technologies and Lawyer Competence, 85 J.
KAN. B. Ass'N 38, 42 (2016).
94. See Mart, supra note 74, at 421.
95. Id.at421-22.
9 6. Id
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arm their students with the "metacognitive skills required to be self-reliant"
in their investigations of the law. 7
V.

CONCLUSION

One thing is certain: technology will only become more ubiquitous and
sophisticated in the practice of law. The ABA had a prescient understanding
of this as it amended the Duty of Competence to include a Duty of
Technology Competence. And most states have followed suit, as they
amended their respective model rules to require the duty within their
jurisdiction.
As Robert Ambrogi stated, the Duty of Technology Competence
represents a "sea change" in the practice of law. 98 We are just starting to see
this sea change as various guidance documents have provided a glimpse into
the ethical responsibilities under the duty. Though only some jurisdictions
adhere to the formal duty, all lawyers should now use reasonable care and
remain cognizant of the ethical implications of the technology they use in
the practice of law. Not only are there very real issues regarding the lack of
transparency and potential bias that may be perpetuated through blindly
relying on algorithms, there are also theoretical issues in giving independent
judgment over to machines.
As we move from the Information Age to the Algorithmic Society
where artificial intelligence and algorithms will increasingly be used to
create greater efficiencies and govern populations, lawyers must act as
information fiduciaries for their clients and protect them from the potential
ills. It is important that the legal academy takes note and helps to prepare
prospective lawyers to comply with the Duty of Technology Competence in
practice.
This will be an uphill battle as the Google Generation starts to inhabit
the halls of the law school having become comfortable with incompetent
research skills the research skills that have them relying on the top few
results generated by algorithms with little thought given to evaluating the
content. As part of the core legal education, legal educators must capitalize
on moments to discuss the issues surrounding the use of algorithms with
their students to ensure that the students have an understanding of the
benefits and risks associated with the relevant technology.

97. Id. at 420.
98. Ambrogi, supra note 2.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2018

21

*

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 69, Iss. 3 [2018], Art. 3

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol69/iss3/3

22

